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Abstract: As trade between China and African countries continues to expand, so 
does the debate as regards the developmental outcomes it is likely to produce. This 
paper examines the trade relations that have developed between the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and China since 2000. The 
bilateral trade—composed largely of exports of primary goods and imports of 
manufactures by the COMESA region—has registered very high rates of growth. 
The trade balance has been for the most part in China’s favor. The paper uses a 
gravity model of bilateral trade estimated by the Hausman-Taylor method for a 
reference sample of countries to project the COMESA-China trade “out of sample.” 
Empirical estimates suggest a substantial degree of underutilization of the bilateral 
export and import potentials. The main implication is that there are still strong 
resistances to the bilateral trade that need to be addressed.    
Introduction 
It is widely recognized that international trade plays an important role in the process of 
economic development. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) in 2000 in Beijing, the value of goods and services moving between China and the 
African continent has witnessed exponential growth. From its initially negligible position, China 
has become Africa’s major trade partner. China has also signed bilateral trade agreements with 
several African countries (China, 2010), and it has declared that “when conditions are ripe,” it is 
willing to negotiate free trade agreement with African countries and African regional organizations 
(China, 2006). 
 
Economists have debated about the opportunities and challenges of the Sino-African trade 
(e.g., World Bank, 2004; Jenkins & Edwards 2005; Broadman, 2007; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2008). 
Much of the existing literature assumes that China and Africa have high unexploited trade 
opportunities between them (e.g., Jenkins and Edwards, 2005; Zafar, 2007; Subramanian & 
Matthijs 2007). But what is often missing is rigorous analysis. Few studies have tried to predict 
the China-Africa trade based on econometric analysis—much less focusing on specific regional 
trade blocs in Africa. The existing discourse often takes “Africa” as a whole, which has its own 
limitations (Taylor, 2009). While there is scant empirical literature on China’s trade integration 
with particular regional economic communities in Africa, it has been recognized that African 
regional organizations play an important role in “China’s response to the demands and challenges 
it is faced with as an emerging economic and political power in Africa” (Van Hoeymissen, 2011). 
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the trade link and potential between China 
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).11 China is now the 
world’s second largest economy (after the United States) with about one-fifth of the world 
population. COMESA is one of the largest and most vibrant regional economic 
communities in Africa (Alemayehu & Haile, 2008). The regional bloc attained a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) in 2000, and it is now moving toward a Customs Union (COMESA, 2013). 
With a combined population of 460 million, a combined GDP of US$540 billion and rich 
endowment of natural resources, COMESA can play a major role in conditioning China’s 
trade integration with Africa with significant developmental consequence.12 Indeed, China 
appointed representatives to COMESA (Van Hoeymissen, 2011), while COMESA as a 
regional bloc has been seeking to establish trade agreements with China. The COMESA 
Secretariat said in a statement: “COMESA has named China as a new lucrative destination 
for its expansion programs in enhancing trade and attracting investment.”13   
In this paper, merchandise trade between COMESA and China is analyzed and the 
bilateral trade potential is econometrically estimated using a dataset for the period 2000–
2011. Estimation of the trade potential is based on McPherson and Trumbull (2008), where 
a gravity model of bilateral trade will be estimated by a Hausman and Taylor (1981) method 
for “out-of-sample” trade projection. The paper finds strong evidence for future COMESA-
China trade prospects.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief analysis of 
trade patterns between COMESA and China in the recent past. Section III discusses the 
literature on gravity models of bilateral trade and their econometric estimation. Section IV 
empirically investigates the trade potential between COMESA countries and China. 
Section V concludes.  
The Patterns of COMESA-China Trade 
Trade between COMESA and China has accelerated in recent years. This is perhaps due to 
trade reforms in both regions (Zafar, 2007). Between 2000 and 2011, merchandise exports from 
COMESA to China increased from close to US$894 million to US$16 billion, averaging an annual 
growth rate of more than 480% (Table 1). If one excluded the extremely outlying growth rates for 
Burundi, Seychelles and Swaziland, COMESA exports to China would still grow on average by 
more than 145% per annum. Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that COMESA imported US$1.5 billion 
                                                 
11 COMESA is a membership of 19 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. It was established by a Treaty signed in November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and ratified in 
December 1994 in Lilongwe, Malawi. It was formed to replace the former Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (PTA) which had existed since 1981(see http://www.comesa.int). 
12 Of the total value of Chinese-African merchandise trade in 2012, COMESA accounted for over 27%. 
13“COMESA Seeks Partnership with China.” 2005. People’s Daily Online, April 28. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/28/eng20050428_182973.html (accessed November 27, 2012).  
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in merchandise from China in 2000. The import figure rose to US$17.2 billion in 2011, at a rate 
of 39.7% per annum. 
 
Table 1. COMESA’s Merchandise Exports to China, 2000–2011 
    
 
Values 
(US$ Thousand) 
  
Average Growth Rates 
(%) 
 
    
     2000 
 
          2005 
 
2011 
 
 
2000–11 
   
 
Burundi  742 123 2,812  1930.1  
Comoros  4 0.4 1  91.0  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 664 276,222 3,016,477  172.3  
Djibouti  10 195 142  319.6  
Egypt  39,148 109,272 968,517  76.9  
Eritrea  38 251 936  362.9  
Ethiopia  935 90,444 283,443  120.0  
Kenya  3,424 17,040 61,564  31.8  
Libya  23,472 810,676 1,816,524  406.3  
Madagascar 5,918 21,131 91,049  34.0  
Malawi  132 2,368 55,056  413.3  
Mauritius  1,156 6,323 6,397  51.4  
Rwanda  1,488 12,317 56,390  53.8  
Seychelles  88 7 421  1107.9  
Sudan  673,688 2,680,168 6,012,749  28.3  
Swaziland  148 24,945 839  3784.8  
Uganda  661 15,959 41,207  76.1  
Zambia  41,425 117,095 2,926,234  63.8  
Zimbabwe 
  
100,716 
 
131,313 
 
562,891 
  
29.2 
  
 
All COMESA 
 
893,858 
 
4,315,850 
 
15,903,648 
   
481.8 
   
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013). 
Note. The average growth rate for Comoros’ exports to China does not include the period 2002–2005 due to 
missing data.  
 
COMESA and China have become increasingly important in each other’s trade profiles, 
but not to the same degree (Table 4). While there has been a marked shift in COMESA’s trade 
toward China and China has become COMESA’s second largest trade partner—only behind the 
European Union (EU), trade with COMESA still comprises a very small proportion of China’s 
total trade. The share of China in COMESA’s total exports has more than quintupled, from 3.1% 
to 16.1% during 2000–2011, while the share of COMESA in China’s overall exports only rose 
from 0.6% to 0.9%. In the same period, the share of China in COMESA’s total imports grew from 
4.1% to 10.6%, whereas the share of COMESA in China’s world imports increased from 0.5% to 
1.2%.   
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Table 2. COMESA’s Merchandise Imports from China, 2000–11 
    
 
Values  
(US$ Thousand) 
   
Average Growth Rates  
(%) 
 
    
       2000 
 
           2005 
 
          2011 
   
 
2000–11 
   
 
Burundi  5,663 12,150 63,472  33.0  
Comoros  249 1,651 13,232  53.7  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 19,598 82,631 882,496  45.8  
Djibouti  24,896 24,964 97,908  18.1  
Egypt  640,388 914,544 6,320,561  29.8  
Eritrea  3,365 13,684 246,081  92.6  
Ethiopia  96,673 516,952 1,718,111  34.3  
Kenya  113,894 413,371 1,859,098  30.7  
Libya  52,399 251,301 768,991  31.1  
Madagascar 88,667 234,454 540,631  44.6  
Malawi  8,664 28,762 206,374  37.3  
Mauritius  157,558 310,247 625,899  14.6  
Rwanda  4,245 15,673 108,528  45.0  
Seychelles  3,778 6,890 12,428  16.3  
Sudan  154,956 1,447,890 1,994,640  32.6  
Swaziland  3,231 35,511 178,303  73.5  
Uganda  39,782 108,800 513,555  33.7  
Zambia  19,049 83,131 703,038  51.0  
Zimbabwe 
  
35,370 
 
112,408 
 
383,034 
  
36.0 
  
 
All COMESA 
 
1,472,425 
 
4,615,014 
 
 17,236,381 
   
39.7 
   
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013). 
Note. The figures on Sudan’s imports from China in 2010–2011 are based on China’s export data.  
 
 
The significance of trade with China (in terms of value) also varies widely between 
individual COMESA member states (Table 5). On the export side, China’s share in the value of 
total merchandise exports reaches as high as 56% in Sudan, 46% in Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and 33% in Zambia, whereas the corresponding share is less than 1% in Comoros, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. But the Chinese share in total exports has increased 
in almost all COMESA countries over the 2000–2011 period, with Comoros, Djibouti and Eritrea 
being the only exceptions. On the import side, China makes up between 15–30% of the value of 
total merchandise imports in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar and Sudan; the corresponding share is found to be less than 5% in Comoros and 
Seychelles.  
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Table 3. Country Distribution of COMESA’s Trade with China (%) 
  
 
COMESA Exports 
to China 
 
COMESA Imports      
from China 
 
 
Burundi  0.01  0.3  
Comoros  0.00001  0.1  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 15.1  3.8  
Djibouti  0.001  0.6  
Egypt  5.7  34.7  
Eritrea  0.005  0.8  
Ethiopia  1.8  13.5  
Kenya  0.3  10.7  
Libya  18.5  6.2  
Madagascar 0.5  3.3  
Malawi  0.2  1.1  
Mauritius  0.05  3.9  
Rwanda  0.2  0.6  
Seychelles  0.001  0.1  
Sudan  41.6  12.3  
Swaziland  0.1  0.5  
Uganda  0.3  3.0  
Zambia  13.2  2.6  
Zimbabwe 
   
2.4 
   
1.9 
   
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).  
Note. Figures are based on 2009–2011 average trade values. 
 
 
 
Table 4. COMESA and China: Mutual Importance in Merchandise Trade 
      
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2011 
 
 
COMESA exports to China as % of 3.1 6.6 16.1 
COMESA world exports    
China exports to COMESA as % of 0.6 0.7 0.9 
China world exports     
COMESA imports from China as % 4.1 7.5 10.6 
of COMESA world imports    
China imports from COMESA as % 0.5 0.7 1.2 
of China world imports  
       
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013). 
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Table 5. Share of China in Merchandise Exports and Imports of COMESA Countries (%) 
    
 
2000 
   
2011 
 
    
 
Exports 
 
       Imports 
   
       Exports 
 
     Imports 
 
 
Burundi  1.5 3.8  2.3 8.4 
Comoros  0.03 0.6  0.01 4.8 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.1 2.8  45.7 16.0 
Djibouti  0.03 12.0  0.2 19.2 
Egypt  0.8 4.6  3.1 10.1 
Eritrea  0.2 0.7  0.2 29.4 
Ethiopia  0.2 7.7  10.8 19.3 
Kenya  0.2 3.9  1.1 12.6 
Libya  0.2 1.4  10.1 9.6 
Madagascar 0.7 9.0  6.2 18.3 
Malawi  0.03 1.6  3.9 8.5 
Mauritius  0.1 7.6  0.2 12.1 
Rwanda  2.9 2.0  13.5 6.1 
Seychelles  0.05 1.1  0.1 1.8 
Sudan  41.3 10.0  56.4 21.6 
Swaziland  0.02 0.3  0.04 9.1 
Uganda  0.1 2.6  1.9 9.1 
Zambia  4.6 2.1  32.5 9.8 
Zimbabwe 
   
5.2 
 
1.9 
   
16.0 
 
8.7 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).  
 
 
Regarding bilateral trade balance, it has been usually in deficit for COMESA. This is born 
out by Figure 1. There was a bilateral trade deficit of about US$579 million for COMESA as a 
bloc in 2000. It then narrowed to US$299 million in 2005, and it was even replaced by trade 
surpluses during 2006–2007 due to a higher growth of exports to China over imports from China. 
COMESA’s bilateral trade balance subsequently worsened to show deficits during 2008–2009 in 
the face of a sharp drop in exports growth before it registered a trade surplus in 2010 as exports 
increased dramatically. But the trade balance turned deficit for COMESA once again in 2011 
owing mainly to a high rise in imports and the deficit peaked at US$1.3 billion for the period. 
COMESA’s exports of petroleum and related products (mainly from Sudan and Libya) exert a 
significant influence on the balance of trade with China. It can be seen from Figure 1 that without 
these commodities, the trade deficits for COMESA would be continuous and even higher.     
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Figure 1. COMESA’s Trade Balance with China 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013).  
Note. Trade balance is obtained as COMESA’s merchandise exports to China minus COMESA’s 
merchandise imports from China.  
 
This trade imbalance can be explained by, among other things, the structure of the two-
way trade. COMESA exports to China lack diversification and are heavily concentrated in primary 
commodities with limited value addition (Figure 2). They are particularly driven by petroleum and 
related products, which account for 60% of the value of total COMESA exports to China. The next 
important export commodities are ores and metals (31%). By contrast, COMESA imports from 
China are largely comprised of manufactures. Machinery and transport equipment account for 43% 
of the value of total COMESA imports from China, followed by miscellaneous manufactured 
articles such as articles of apparel, clothing accessories, footwear and furniture (16%), textile yarn 
and related products (11%), and chemical products (8%). Other manufactured goods together 
constitute 18% of COMESA imports from China.   
 
The above structure of COMESA-China trade is consistent with Zafar’s (2007) argument 
that trade between Africa and China closely follows “what would be expected from comparative 
advantage and the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model,” with Africa exporting primary 
commodities and China exporting manufactures. However, there are concerns (e.g., Kaplinsky & 
Morris, 2008) that such trade pattern could narrow the space for industrial development and 
economic diversification of a regional grouping like COMESA. 
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Figure 2. Product Composition of COMESA’s Trade with China 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).  
  Note: Figures are based on 2009–11 average trade values. 
 
 
 
Gravity Model and Econometric Issues 
 
Gravity Model 
The gravity model of bilateral trade has been extensively applied in the empirical literature 
on international economics since its first introduction by Tinbergen (1962). One of its most popular 
applications has been simulation of bilateral trade potentials (Baldwin, 1994; Brenton & Di Mauro 
1998; Chionis & Liargovas 2002). In the traditional concept of gravity model, bilateral trade can 
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be explained by national incomes and both trade impediment and preference factors (Egger, 2002). 
As in Deardorff (1995), the simple version of gravity model can be specified as    
               𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝐷𝑖𝑗
,                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the value of exports from country i to country j, the 𝑌’s are national incomes of the 
two countries, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is geographical distance between them, and 𝐴 is a constant of proportionality. 
Bilateral trade is thus directly related to national income and inversely related to geographical 
distance.  
Notwithstanding gravity model’s consistent empirical success (Bergstrand, 1985), the 
model was initially criticized for lack of strong theoretical foundations. Anderson (1979), however, 
settled this criticism when he derived the model from constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin. The gravity model has since been 
derived from different trade theories, including Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and increasing returns 
to scale theories (Evenett & Keller, 2002).  
Another major criticism has been specifically related to the projection of bilateral trade 
potentials. Some studies used “in-sample” trade projection, meaning that they estimate the gravity 
equation on a sample including the countries of interest and then define trade potential by the 
residuals of the estimated equation (Baldwin, 1994). The in-sample approach is, however, severely 
criticized by Egger (2002), who argues that systematic variations in residuals reflect 
misspecification of the econometric model rather than trade potential. The alternative approach is 
to use “out-of-sample” trade projection (Chionis & Liargovas 2002). The out-of-sample approach 
excludes the countries of interest from the sample while estimating the gravity equation and then 
applies the parameter estimates derived by the reference sample to the countries of interest in order 
to predict their “natural” trade flows. The difference between the actual and the predicted trade 
flows is then interpreted as unrealized trade potential. This approach is most appropriate when the 
countries of interest are in the early stage of transformation (Egger, 2002). In this study, the out-
of-sample technique is used to estimate the trade potential between COMESA countries and China 
by excluding the former from the estimated equation.   
Econometric Issues  
Major concerns have been raised on the choice of econometric estimation techniques in 
empirical gravity models. For instance, Mátyás (1997) criticizes cross-section approaches and 
argues that the correct econometric specification of the gravity model is a triple-indexed model 
with exporter, importer and time effects. This means that conclusions on trade potentials based on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique are problematic (Egger, 2002). But the gravity literature 
has been less clear as to how to treat country-specific effects. Egger (2000) advocates a fixed 
effects model on the basis of a Hausman (1978) specification test and an intuitive argument that 
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country effects are widely predetermined. Mátyás (1998), on the other hand, argues that for some 
datasets, it may be more appropriate to formalize these effects as random variables, which leads to 
a random effects model.  
Both fixed effects and random effects approaches have limitations, however. The fixed 
effects approach has two shortcomings. First, it eliminates from the model observed time-invariant 
characteristics (such as distance), all of which are simply absorbed into the fixed effects (Greene, 
2003). Second, it cannot be used for out-of-sample trade prediction unless one makes ad hoc 
assumptions to decompose the fixed effects into a component that is common across the trade 
partners and one that is specific to the partner (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). The random effects 
treatment does allow the model to include time-invariant variables. But the main drawback of the 
random effects approach is that it assumes, with little justification, that the random effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors. If the correlation exists, then the resulting estimator is 
inconsistent (Greene, 2003).  
For the purpose of the present paper, McPherson and Trumbull’s suggestion is followed, 
which is to apply the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator of panel data. Hausman-Taylor 
estimator is an instrumental variables estimator of the random effects model that uses only the 
information within the model (Greene, 2003). It is appealing for two reasons. First, it allows for 
the inclusion of time-invariant variables and generates out-of-sample trade forecasts without the 
need to make any ad hoc assumptions required by the fixed effects estimator. Second, it removes 
the correlation between the random effects and the regressors, which is the cause of the rejection 
of standard random effects estimator. Thus, time-invariant variables can be consistently estimated 
without compromising the estimates for time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008).  
Other econometric estimation choices that matter for results obtained from the gravity 
equation include choice of dependent variable, measure of variables (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006), 
functional form (Sanso, Cuairan, & Sanz 1993; Coe, Subramanian, & Tamirisa, 2007) and 
treatment of zero trade observations (Baldwin 1994; Brülhart & Kelly, 1999).  
Empirical Evidence of COMESA-China Trade Potential 
 
Empirical Model 
The empirical model employed in this study is the gravity model of McPherson and 
Trumbull (2008). The general specification of the model follows the econometric specification of 
the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator:     
       𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽2 + 𝑍1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛿1 + 𝑍2𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛿2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                              (2) 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is defined as the value of imports of country i from country j in year t, 𝑋1 are variables 
that are time-varying and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋2  are variables that are time-varying and 
correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗, 𝑍1 are variables that are time-invariant and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗, and 𝑍2 are 
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variables that are time-invariant and correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗. 𝛼 is a constant term, and 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛿1 and 
𝛿2 are vectors of slope parameters. (𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) is a compound disturbance, where 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is country 
pair-specific unobserved random effect that does not vary over time and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error component 
that varies in both the country pair and time dimensions. 
As pointed out by Greene (2003), it is the likely presence of 𝑋2 and 𝑍2 that complicates 
estimation of the random effects model. The Hausman-Taylor strategy is to estimate equation (2) 
by instrumental variables technique. There is no need to use external instruments. First, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 
are transformed into their deviations from group means, as in fixed effects estimation. The group 
mean deviations can then be used as instrumental variables. Second, because 𝑍1 is exogenous by 
definition, it can also serve as a group of instrumental variables. Finally, the group means of 𝑋1 
can serve as instruments for 𝑍2, and the model will be identified so long as the number of variables 
in 𝑋1 is at least as large as the number of variables in 𝑍2.   
Following McPherson and Trumbull, 𝑋1 contains per capita GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡), 
populations (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡) and the absolute value of the difference in index of economic 
freedom (𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) of the trade partners i and j. For 𝑋2, the model includes the index of economic 
freedom of each partner (𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡) and the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita 
of the partners (𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡). It is argued that levels of economic freedom and difference in GDP 
per capita are likely to be correlated with other governmental, institutional, geographical or social 
characteristics not explicitly included in the model and captured by 𝜇𝑖𝑗. 𝑍1 comprises geographical 
distance between trade partners (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) and dummy variables for both partners with common 
land border (𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗), common language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗) and regional trade agreement (𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗). For 𝑍2, 
the model has dummies for both trade partners with a communist past (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗) and both having a 
non-communist past (𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗). There is a potential for having a communist or non-communist 
past to be correlated with characteristics related to trade barriers, competitive markets or 
longstanding relationships that are included in 𝜇𝑖𝑗 (McPherson and Trumbull 2008). Hence, the 
estimated gravity equation may be written in log-linear form as  
     ln 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽11 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡  
                    + 𝛽15 ln 𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽21 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽23 ln 𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                    + 𝛿11 ln 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿12𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿13𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿14𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿21𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 
                    + 𝛿22𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                          (3) 
 
Typically, a positive sign is expected for 𝛽11, 𝛽12, 𝛿12, 𝛿13, 𝛿14 and 𝛿22. Importer’s per 
capita GDP as a measure of income and exporter’s per capita GDP as a measure of the variety of 
output are expected to have a positive impact on bilateral trade (Baldwin, 1994). Dummies for 
common land border and language are used to capture information costs. Countries with common 
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language and border tend to trade more with each other due to lower information (search) costs 
resulting from better knowledge of each other’s “business practices, competitiveness and delivery 
reliability” (Piermartini & Teh, 2005). Regional trade agreements are intended to reduce tariffs 
and other barriers to trade between countries. Hence, they are likely to have a positive effect on 
trade among members (Frankel, Stein & Wei, 1995). Communist countries, McPherson and 
Trumbull argue, are historically associated with closed economies that are less open to trade. Thus, 
trade is also likely to be higher between countries that do not have a communist past.       
The coefficients of 𝛽15, 𝛽21, 𝛽22, 𝛽23, 𝛿11 and 𝛿21, on the other hand, are expected to have 
a negative sign. The absolute value of the difference in per capita GDP between countries measures 
economic distance (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). This variable has an expected negative sign 
because according to the Linder hypothesis, countries with similar levels of income per capita will 
exhibit similar tastes, produce similar but differentiated products and trade more among 
themselves (Roberts, 2004). High levels of economic freedom signify low levels of government, 
social, or political barriers to trade. The index of economic freedom is such that a higher value 
indicates less freedom, and therefore a negative sign is expected (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). 
Following the spirit of the Linder hypothesis, the closer two countries are in terms of their 
economic freedom levels, the more likely they are to trade. The greater the distance between two 
trade partners, the higher the transportation costs and hence the less the two-way trade (Bergstrand, 
1985). Countries with a communist past tend to trade less and thus a negative coefficient is 
assigned for this dummy variable.   
As for the coefficients of population, they are theoretically ambiguous. The population 
coefficient of the exporting country (𝛽14) may be negatively or positively signed, depending on 
whether the country exports less when it is big (absorption effect) or whether a big country exports 
more than a small country (economies of scale). For similar reasons, the population coefficient of 
the importing country (𝛽13) may also assume a positive or negative sign (Martinez-Zarzoso & 
Nowak-Lehmann, 2003).  
In line with the out-of-sample technique of trade projection, the above gravity coefficients 
are estimated using trade flows between a reference sample of countries that exclude the COMESA 
region. Then the coefficient estimates derived by the reference sample are applied to COMESA-
China data to predict their potential or “natural” trade flows. This calculation can be done as 
follows (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008):   
    ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ?̂? + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ ?̂? + 𝑍𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛿,                                                                                          (4) 
where ?̂? denotes the predicted value of 𝑀. ?̂?, ?̂? and 𝛿 refer to the coefficient estimates. 𝑋 and 𝑍 
stand for the time-varying and time-invariant variables, respectively. In the final analysis, ?̂?  is to 
be compared with 𝑀 to assess the magnitude of unrealized trade potential.  
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The Data  
 
The dataset contains annual data for 43 selected countries covering the period 2000–11. 
The countries encompass developed as well as developing economies of the world, which are 
assumed to be well integrated into the international market.14 The dependent variable is bilateral 
merchandise imports in thousands of current US dollars sourced from UNCTAD (2013). 
Therefore, the potential number of total observations is 21,672 (= 43 × 42 × 12) for the twelve-
year period. The dependent variable takes on a zero value for only 45 observations (due to missing 
trade flows), which ensures 21,627 observations in the regression model. Data on GDP per capita 
in current US dollars and population are drawn from World Bank (2013). Indices of economic 
freedom are obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2013). Each of these indices has ten 
components of economic freedom, ranging from property rights to financial freedom. Bilateral 
distances are derived from CEPII (2012). The distances refer to great-circle distances in kilometers 
between the capital cities of trade partners.  
Border and language dummy variables are compiled from CEPII (2012). The border 
dummy takes the value 1 for a pair of countries (i, j) with a common land border, and 0 otherwise. 
The language dummy has the value 1 if both countries have a common official language, and 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable for regional trade agreement is created using information obtained 
from WTO (2013). The regional trade agreements include free trade agreements and customs 
unions. This dummy has the value 1 for a pair of countries with membership in the same regional 
trade agreement, and 0 otherwise. Finally, data on dummy variables for a communist and non-
communist past come from Information Please (2013). One of the dummy variables (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗) has 
the value 1 if trading countries i and j both have a communist past; 0 otherwise. The other dummy 
(𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗) equals 1 if both countries have a non-communist past; 0 otherwise. 
 
The Results  
 
The estimates for OLS, fixed effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators of 
equation (3) are reported in Table 6. They are obtained by STATA Version 12 software package. 
The F test statistic is 161.36 and is significant at the 1% level. This indicates the presence of 
unobserved bilateral effects and hence inappropriateness of the OLS technique. The Hausman 
(1978) test based on the difference between the fixed effects and random effects estimators gives 
an observed chi-squared value of 1482.81. This is significant at the 1% level and reveals that the 
random effects model suffers from correlation between the explanatory variables and the bilateral 
effects. This suggests the fixed estimater is better choice. But, as already noted, the effects of all 
time-invariant variables are eliminated in a fixed effects approach.  
                                                 
14 For list of the countries used in reference sample, see Appendix, Table A1. 
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Table 6. Gravity Model Estimates for the Reference Sample (Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Imports) 
   
 
       OLS 
 
    Random Effects 
 
    Fixed Effects 
 
HT I 
 
HT II 
 
 
Constant   –46.631*** (0.513) –15.852*** (0.615) —     4.109       (4.784)   –15.355     (17.692) 
Importer per capita GDP     0.670*** (0.010) 0.730*** (0.011) 0.855*** (0.014) 0.817*** (0.013) 0.854*** (0.014) 
Exporter per capita GDP     0.661*** (0.010) 0.517*** (0.011) 0.528*** (0.014) 0.500*** (0.013) 0.529*** (0.014) 
Difference in per capita GDP   –0.025*** (0.006)  –0.026*** (0.005) –0.020*** (0.005) –0.020*** (0.005) –0.020*** (0.005) 
Importer population      0.918*** (0.006) 0.784*** (0.018) 0.548*** (0.103) 0.565*** (0.071) 0.474*** (0.099) 
Exporter population      0.970*** (0.006) 0.726*** (0.018) –0.977*** (0.103)   –0.140**   (0.071) –0.902*** (0.099) 
Distance     –0.881*** (0.011) –0.872*** (0.034) — –0.635*** (0.233) 6.258*** (1.839) 
Importer freedom index      2.502*** (0.083) –0.253*** (0.064) –0.436*** (0.065) –0.453*** (0.063) –0.444*** (0.065) 
Exporter freedom index      2.823*** (0.083)  –0.041       (0.064) –0.447*** (0.065) –0.366*** (0.063) –0.438*** (0.065) 
Difference in freedom index     0.023**   (0.010)  –0.022*** (0.007) –0.029*** (0.007) –0.031*** (0.006) –0.029*** (0.007) 
Common border      0.526*** (0.041)    0.556*** (0.136) —    1.911       (1.659)    4.431       (5.847) 
Common language      0.458*** (0.027)    0.767*** (0.088) —     0.930       (0.654)   14.020*** (3.995) 
Regional trade agreement     0.134*** (0.019)     –0.065       (0.061) —   –0.264       (0.369)  6.408*** (2.119) 
Both communist      0.635*** (0.060)     0.295       (0.199) — –13.963     (28.436)   46.616   (100.174) 
Both non-communist      0.134*** (0.019) 0.427*** (0.060) —   –1.763       (4.487)  –43.447** (19.049) 
        
Number of observations 21627 21627 21627 21627 21627 
Number of groups  — 1804 1804 1804 1804 
R-squared   0.771 0.726 0.577 — — 
Bilateral effects: F(1803, 19815) — — 161.36*** — — 
Hausman specification test: χ2(8) 
 
— 
 
1482.81*** 
 
— 
 
148.90*** 
 
8.49 
 
 
 Notes: 1. All explanatory variables except dummies are expressed in natural logarithms.  
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. OLS standard errors are not adjusted for the variance components. 
4. Estimates in HT I column are Hausman-Taylor estimates according to McPherson and Trumbull (2008). 
5. Estimates in HT II column are Hausman-Taylor estimates with endogenous importer and exporter per capita GDPs,  
holding everything else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull. 
*** and ** denote level of statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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The Hausman-Taylor estimates of the gravity equation are presented in the final two columns 
of Table 6. The HT I column refers to the specification of McPherson and Trumbull with their 
choice of exogenous and endogenous variables as in equation (3). The time-varying parameter 
estimates are generally close to their fixed effects counterparts. They also have the expected signs, 
except for regional trade agreement and common non-communist past. However, the effects of all 
time-invariant variables, except for bilateral distance, are not estimated significantly. Furthermore, 
the Hausman test based on the difference between the fixed effects and HT I estimators produces 
a chi-squared value of 148.90, which is significant at the 1% level. This means that the hypothesis 
that the results of HT I are generated from valid set of instruments is rejected.   
To correct this problem in the original model, the results are checked for sensitivity to 
alternative choices of the exogenous time-varying variables (Baltagi & Khanti-Akom, 1990). The 
HT II column of Table 6 presents the results for a model where the importer and exporter per capita 
GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) are treated as endogenous (correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗), keeping everything 
else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The Hausman test for this specification yields 
a highly insignificant chi-squared value of 8.49, so the legitimacy of the instrument set is not 
rejected. Nearly all the estimated parameters of the time-varying variables have moved even closer 
to the fixed effects parameters. This confirms that it has been possible to separate the effects of 
time-invariant variables using the Hausman-Taylor estimator without compromising the parameter 
estimates of the time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). HT II, therefore, is the 
preferred model in this study. 
Most coefficient estimates of HT II have the expected sign and statistically significant effect 
on bilateral trade. It has been possible to successfully estimate the effect of common language and 
regional trade agreement—time-invariant variables that would be dropped in the fixed effects 
estimation. As in McPherson and Trumbull’s study, common border turns out to have an 
insignificant effect on trade and, contrary to expectations, the distance variable has a positive effect 
but here it is also statistically significant. Likewise, the effects of common communist and non-
communist past have the wrong sign but only the latter is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
As a next step, the HT II coefficient estimates are used to predict COMESA countries’ 
“natural” trade values with China, according to equation (4). For the sake of convenience in 
interpreting trade potential, average ratios of actual to predicted trade values are calculated for the 
period 2009–2011. A ratio of less than one indicates unutilized trade potential. Table 7 reports the 
results. It appears that all COMESA countries are trading with China far below their potential. The 
average ratios of actual to predicted trade are found to be less than one half. In fact, in all but one 
of the cases, actual imports and exports fall more than 60 percentage points under their “natural” 
levels (a ratio of less than 0.40). This may not be surprising given that China and COMESA 
countries have strengthened their bilateral trade ties only recently. The results also confirm 
expectations of other authors (Jenkins & Edwards, 2005).  
44 http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad 
 
Despite some striking similarities, Table 7 shows that the export ratios are generally lower 
than the import ratios. In other words, COMESA’s exports to China have performed worse than 
its imports have. It seems that China has targeted the COMESA market more aggressively than 
COMESA has targeted the Chinese market. Within the COMESA region, the ratios of actual to 
expected exports to China are particularly low for small countries such as Comoros, Eritrea and 
Seychelles, while they are relatively higher for Sudan and Libya (both predominantly oil 
exporters), as well as Egypt and Zambia. As far as imports from China are concerned, Egypt is the 
highest performer in the regional grouping with actual values of more than 40% of the expected 
amount, while Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia are the lowest performers 
with 14–17%. In sum, though, these results offer robust indication for bright prospects for 
COMESA-China trade.   
Table 7. Ratio of COMESA Countries’ Actual to Predicted Trade with China 
    
 
Imports 
   
         Exports 
   
 
Burundi   0.30   0.18  
Comoros  0.26  0.05  
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.16  0.16  
Djibouti  0.32  0.12  
Egypt  0.41  0.33  
Eritrea  0.14  0.07  
Ethiopia  0.17  0.14  
Kenya  0.38  0.25  
Libya  0.36  0.33  
Madagascar 0.35  0.26  
Malawi  0.32  0.23  
Mauritius  0.35  0.19  
Rwanda  0.31  0.24  
Seychelles  0.26  0.08  
Sudan  0.38  0.37  
Swaziland  0.28  0.16  
Uganda  0.35  0.24  
Zambia  0.33  0.32  
Zimbabwe 
  
0.33 
  
0.28 
  
Note: Trade ratios are calculated based on average data for 2009–2011. 
 
Two implications can be drawn from the above results. First, there appear to be significant 
trade impediments between COMESA and China. The two-way trade is likely to continue to 
expand with more trade-enhancing policy measures on both sides. The measures might be toward 
reducing bilateral trade barriers as well as developing COMESA’s exporting capabilities. Second, 
COMESA and China need to anticipate the developmental impacts from future expansion of the 
bilateral trade. The impacts may be far-reaching, inasmuch as the bilateral trade potential is 
enormous. 
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Conclusion 
This paper investigates the trade patterns and potential between COMESA and China. The 
empirical analysis shows that the bilateral trade has seen a high growth rate in the 2000s, and that 
COMESA exports to China are largely driven by primary products (particularly oil) while the 
imports are manufactures in the main. The natural resource-rich economies of Sudan, Libya, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia account for the lion’s share of COMESA’s exports 
to China. Two other imbalances in COMESA’s current trade integration with China are worth 
noting. First, whereas China has become a major trade partner of COMESA (although the 
significance varies widely between individual COMESA member states), the share of COMESA 
in China’s overall trade profile remains small by comparison. Second, the bilateral trade balance 
in the review period was often in China’s favor, which is partly a reflection of the nature of 
products moving between the two regions.  
The paper obtains indicative estimates of the potential to increase the COMESA-China 
trade based on the gravity model of McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The model fits the data 
reasonably well. Comparing actual and estimated “natural” trade flows indicates that the 
COMESA countries and China are trading much lower than their potential suggests, falling by 
more than 60 percentage points.  
These findings carry policy implications for COMESA-China trade. First, there is a clear 
need for COMESA to diversify its export pattern—product-wise and country-wise—in order to 
better exploit the Chinese market as well as balance the bilateral trade in the longer run. With a 
single commodity and only four member countries dominating COMESA’s exports to China, there 
is considerable room for improvement in exporting capabilities.  
Second, significant trade restrictions seem to exist, preventing the bilateral trade from 
reaching its potential. Thus, activities geared toward reducing existing bilateral trade barriers are 
likely to produce positive results. It is recommended that the policy package needs to look at not 
only formal trade policy variables but also domestic “behind-the-border” business environment 
and “between-the-border” factors, such as trade facilitation infrastructure (Broadman, 2007).  
Finally, it helps both China and particularly COMESA to weigh the benefits and costs of 
the bilateral trade in terms of their overall development strategies. This paper estimates—
conditional on the model used—the unrealized trade potential to be high. It is thus anticipated that 
any effects on economic development will deepen as the bilateral trade continues to expand in the 
future.  
It is worth noting that estimation of trade potential in the gravity model setup can be done 
either at the aggregate or sectoral level. The results presented here are drawn from aggregated 
exports and imports. It is possible that within the aggregates, trade in particular products may be 
in line with the expected level (Brenton & Di Mauro, 1998). Future work may thus obtain richer 
policy implications from further disaggregation of data.  
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Appendix  
Table A1. List of Countries in Gravity Model Regression 
Developed Countries 
 
 
Developing Countries 
 
 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria  
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
France  United Kingdom Mexico   
Germany  United States Morocco   
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Republic of 
   
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014 47 
References 
Alemayehu, G., & Kebret, H. (2008). Regional economic integration in Africa: A review of 
problems and prospects with a case study of COMESA. Journal of African Economies, 17(3), 
357–394. 
Anderson, J. E. (1979). A theoretical foundation for the gravity equation. The American Economic 
Review, 69(1), 106–116. 
Baldwin, R. E. (1994). Towards an integrated Europe. London: Centre for Economic Policy 
Research.  
Baldwin, R., & Taglioni, D. (2006). Gravity for dummies and dummies for gravity equations. 
(NBER Working Paper Series no. 12516). Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Baltagi, B. H., & Khanti-Akom, S. (1990). On efficient estimation with panel data: An empirical 
comparison of instrumental variables estimators. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 5(4), 401–
406.  
Bergstrand, J. H. (1985). The gravity equation in international trade: Some microeconomic 
foundations and empirical evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(3), 474–481. 
Brenton, P., & Di Mauro, F. (1998). Is there any potential in trade in sensitive industrial products 
between the CEECs and the EU? World Economy, 21(3), 285–304. 
Broadman, H. G. (2007). Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Brülhart, M., & Kelly, M. J. (1999). Ireland’s trading potential with central and eastern European 
countries: A gravity study. The Economic and Social Review, 30(2), 159–174. 
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. (2010). China-Africa Economic 
and Trade Cooperation.  Retrieved from: http://english.gov.cn/official/2010-
12/23/content_1771603_ 3.html. 
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. (2012). The GeoDist Database. 
Paris: CEPII. Retrieved from: http://www.cepii.fr/ 
Chionis, D., & Liargovas, P. (2002). An empirical investigation of Greek-Balkan bilateral trade. 
Eastern European Economics, 40(5), 6–32. 
Coe, D. D., Subramanian, A., & Tamirisa, N. T. (2007). The missing globalization puzzle: 
Evidence of the declining importance of distance. IMF Staff Papers, 54(1), 34–58. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). (2013). Report of the Twenty-Ninth 
Meeting of the Trade and Customs Committee. (Report no. CS/TCM/TCM/XXIX/13 - June). 
Lusaka, Zambia: COMESA. 
Communist Countries, Past and Present. (2013). In Infoplease. Boston, MA: Pearson Education. 
Retrieved from: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933874.html. 
Deardorff, A.V. (1995). Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a neo-classical 
world? (NBER Working Paper Series no. 5377). Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Egger, P. (2000). A note on the proper econometric specification of the gravity equation.” 
Economics Letters, 66(1), 25–31. 
48 http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad 
 
Egger, P. (2002). “An econometric view on the estimation of gravity models and the calculation 
of trade potentials. World Economy, 25(2), 297–312. 
Evenett, S. J., & Keller, W. (2002). On theories explaining the success of the gravity equation. 
Journal of Political Economy, 110(2), 281–316. 
Frankel, J., Stein, E., & Wei, S.-J. (1995). Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural, the 
unnatural, and the super-natural. Journal of Development Economics, 47(1), 61–95. 
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics.” Econometrica, 46(6), 1251–1272. 
Hausman, J. A., & Taylor, W. E. (1981). Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects. 
Econometrica, 49(6), 1377–1398. 
Heritage Foundation. (2013). 2013 Index of Economic Freedom. Washington, DC: Heritage 
Foundation. Retrieved from: http://www.heritage.org/index/. 
Jenkins, R., & Edwards, C. (2005). The effect of China and India’s growth and trade liberalisation 
on poverty in Africa. (DCP 70 Final Report). London: Department for International 
Development. 
Kaplinsky, R., & Morris, M. (2008). Do the Asian drivers undermine export-oriented 
industrialization in SSA? World Development, 36(2), 254–273. 
Martinez-Zarzoso, I., & Nowak-Lehmann, F. (2003). Augmented gravity model: An empirical 
application to MERCOSUR-European Union trade flows. Journal of Applied Economics, 
6(2), 291–316. 
Mátyás, L.  (1998). The gravity model: Some econometric considerations. The World Economy, 
21(3), 397–401. 
Mátyás, L. (1997). Proper econometric specification of the gravity model. The World Economy, 
20(3), 363–368. 
McPherson, M. Q., & Trumbull, W. N. (2008). Rescuing observed fixed effects: Using the 
Hausman-Taylor Method for out-of-sample trade projections. The International Trade 
Journal, 22(3), 315–340. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2006). China’s African policy. 
Retrieved from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.html. 
Piermartini, R., & Teh, R. (2005). Demystifying modelling methods for trade policy. (WTO 
Discussion Papers no. 10). Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
Roberts, B. A. (2004). A gravity study of the proposed China-ASEAN free trade area.” The 
International Trade Journal, 18(4), 335–353. 
Sanso, M., Cuairan, R., & Sanz, F. (1993). Bilateral trade flows, the gravity equation, and 
functional form.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(2), 266–275. 
Subramanian, U., & Matthijs, M. (2007). Can Sub-Saharan Africa leap into global network trade? 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4112). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Taylor, I. (2009). China’s new role in Africa.  Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.  
Tinbergen, J. (1962). Shaping the world economy: Suggestions for an international economic 
policy. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 
  International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014 49 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2013). UNCTADstat. New York: United 
Nations. Retrieved from: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/.  
Van Hoeymissen, S. (2011). Regional organizations in China’s security strategy for Africa: The 
sense of supporting ‘African solutions to African problems’. Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs, 40(4), 91–118. 
World Bank. (2004). Patterns of Africa-Asia Trade and Investment: Potential for Ownership and 
partnership. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. (2013). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved 
from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
World Trade Organization. (2013). RTA Database. Geneva, SE: World Trade Organization. 
Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/. 
Zafar, A. (2007). The growing relationship between China and SSA: Macroeconomic, trade, 
investment and aid links. World Bank Research Observer, 22(1), 103–130. 
 
 
 
 
  
